Parallel consensus
Packetization (Transaction blocks)
Vivek Bagaria (Stanford University), Sreeram Kannan, David Tse, Giulia Fanti, Pramod Viswanath
CCS'19
Prism, a new proof-of-work blockchain protocol
1) security against up to 50% adversarial hashing power
2) optimal throughput up to the capacity C of the network
3) confirmation latency for honest transactions proportional to the propagation delay D, with confirmation error probability exponentially small in the bandwidth-delay product CD
4) eventual total ordering of all transactions
Don't validate transactions (prune invalid transactions later)
Model
Synchronous (a la Bitcoin backbone)
It is assumed that selfish mining is disincentivesed
Gerui Wang, Shuo Wang, Vivek Bagaria, David Tse, Pramod Viswanath
Peifang Ni, Hongda Li, Xianning Meng, and Dongxue Pan (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)
Decoupling (leader chain & transaction chain) in PoS
Precursor: Decoupling of Nakamoto consensus
Historical documents
Tier Nolan @Bitcoin Forum 2013.4
Gavin Andresen @Bitcoin Mailing list 2015
Peter R. Rizun
Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gün Sirer, and Robbert van Renesse (Cornell University)
Parallel Chains says that the TPS is 0 when the proposer (intentionally or unintentionally) fail-stop
Transaction sharding
Loi Luu, et al.
Scaling Bitcoin '15 Slide Loi Luu, et al.
CCS'16
PoW to allocate validators to shards, then use PBFT
Sharding of only transaction processing
No cross shard communication
Tayebeh Rajab, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Mohammad Dakhilalian, Murtuza Jadliwala, Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman
Isfahan University of Technology
Sybril Attack against Elastico
Matthias Fitzi, Peter Gaˇzi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell
A theoretical framework for optimistic throughput (w/ "network diffusion functionality")
Parallel composition technique on both PoW and PoS (Ouroboros Praos) blockchain
Transaction sharding
Matthias Fitzi and Peter Gazi and Aggelos Kiayias and Alexander Russell
S´ebastien Forestier and Damir Vodenicarevic
In Parallel Chains,
the adversary can concentrate her mining power to a single chain. It is thus conceivable that a similar tradeoff for liveness has to be tolerated — but expectedly to a lesser extent than for Chainweb, as the honest miners are not incentivized to exclude particular chains from mining. As of now, we know of no analysis to demonstrate any upper bounds on liveness for this protocol
Haifeng Yu Ivica Nikolic Ruomu Hou Prateek Saxena (NUS)
PoW
https://gyazo.com/efb5fc72302c107fa7e035d60433d991
Reduction, etc.
The Honey Badger of BFT
Zsolt Istvan´ IMDEA Software Institute et al.
Mohammad Javad Amiri, Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi (University of California Santa Barbara)
ICDCS'19